and not on beliefs about beliefs. The intellectual home for our exercise is rather what has been called psychological game theory. This framework -originally developed by John Geanakoplos, David Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti (1989) and recently extended by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2005) (henceforth B&D) -allows players'payo¤s to depend on beliefs (about choices, states of nature, or others'beliefs), as is typical of many emotions. 2 Some previous work has considered sentiments related to those we describe for the speci…c context of "trust games." 3 Gary Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) coin the term "guilt aversion," which we adopt as we develop our theory for general games.
I. Game-Theoretic Preliminaries
We consider …nite extensive game forms specifying monetary payo¤s for each player at each end node. These payo¤s describe the material concequences of players actions, not their preferences. The players'utilities will be introduced later on, in Section II.
Extensive game forms. Let N be the player set, T the set of nodes in the game tree with distinguished root t 0 , and Z the set of end nodes (or terminal nodes). The set X = T nZ is partitioned into subsets X i of decision nodes for each i 2 N and the set of chance nodes X c . We let c ( jx) denote the strictly positive chance probabilities of the immediate followers of node x 2 X c . In our theory it is important to represent players'information also at nodes where they are not active. Thus, we let the information structure of i be a partition H i the whole set T that contains as a subcollection the standard information partition of X i . A typical information set is denoted h. The information set containing node t is denoted H i (t).
The (extended) information structure H i satis…es perfect recall. We also assume that H i is a re…nement of fft 0 g; Xnft 0 g; Zg; this means that the players know when they are at the root of the game tree and they know when the game is over. The material consequences of players' actions are determined by functions m i : Z ! R, i 2 N . A typical material payo¤ is denoted by
. We assume that a player observes his material payo¤:
). Whenever we do not explicitly specify players'terminal information, the default assumption is that they have the coarsest terminal information consistent with perfect recall and with their material payo¤.
Pure strategies. A pure strategy s i speci…es a contingent choice for each h 2 H i where i is active (h X i ) . We …nd it convenient to refer to 'pure strategies'also of chance, i.e. functions s c : X c ! T that select an immediate successor of each chance node (such strategies are chosen at random according to the mixed representation of c ). The set of pure strategies of i is S i and
For any h and i, we let S i (h) denote the set of i's strategies allowing h, and let S i (h) S i denote the set of pro…les s i allowing h. We use similar notation for strategies and strategy pro…les consistent with a given node. A strategy pro…le s 2 S (which includes chance's strategy s c ) yields a particular end node denoted z(s).
Behavior strategies. We assume that players do not actually randomize, but randomized choice -in the form of behavior strategies -enter the analysis as an expression of players' beliefs. A behavior strategy for i is an array i of probability measures i ( jh), h 2 H i , h X i , where i (ajh) is the probability of choosing action a at informaton set h. Given i we can compute the probability of each pure strategy s i , denoted Pr i (s i ) (see Harold Kuhn, 1953) .
By perfect recall, one can compute the conditional probabilities Pr i (s i jh), h 2 H i , even if
Conditional beliefs. Conditional on each information set h 2 H i player i holds an updated, or revised, belief i ( jS i (h)) 2 (S i (h)) about the strategies of the co-players and of chance; we abbreviate the notation to i ( jh) whenever convenient. i = ( i ( jh)) h2H i is the system of …rst-order beliefs of i (note that we are including in i also i's beliefs about chance moves, later on we impose the restriction that they are determined by the objective probabilities c ). Player i also holds a second-order belief i (h) about the …rst-order belief system j of each co-player j, a third-order belief i (h) about the second-order beliefs, and so on. For the purposes of this paper, we may assume that higher-order belief are degenerate point beliefs. Thus, with a slight abuse of notation we identify i (h) with a particular array of conditional …rst-order beliefs i = ( j ( jh 0 )) j6 =i;h 0 2H j . A similar notational convention applies to other higher-order beliefs. Clearly, the beliefs that i would hold at di¤erent information sets are not mutually independent. They must satisfy the chain rule of conditional
) and that i has the same (point) higherorder beliefs at h 0 and h 00 ] and they also satisfy common certainty that such rule holds (for details, see B&D). In our equilibrium analysis we consider beliefs at most of the fourth order.
Players initial beliefs are those held at the information set h 0 = ft 0 g.
II. Two Concepts of Guilt Aversion
Given his plan of action s j and initial …rst-order beliefs j ( jh 0 ) player j forms an expectation about his material payo¤:
If at the end of the game i knew the terminal node z, the strategy pro…le
, and j's initial beliefs j , then he could derive how much of D j (z; s j ; j ) is due to his behavior:
Our …rst guilt concept draws directly on G ij (z; s i ; j ). We say that i is a¤ected by simple guilt toward j if he has belief-dependent preferences represented by a payo¤ function of the
Since i does not know s i or i and may not even observe z, u
does not represent a utility "experienced" by i. What we assume is that, given his …rst-and second-order beliefs, i tries to make the expected value of u i as large as possible. 4 We let ( ij ) i;j2N;j6 =i denote the pro…le of players'guilt sensitivity parameters.
Whereas with simple guilt a player cares about the extent to which he lets another player down, our second formulation assumes that a player cares about others' inferences regarding 4 (1) yields the same sequential best response correspondence as the slightly simpler function v i (z;
. We use (1) for two reasons: it is conceptually more appropriate (i cannot be "guilty" for behavior due to others), and expression G ij (z; s i ; i ) is needed below to de…ne our second concept of guilt. the extent which he is willing to let them down. We model this as follows: Given his strategy s i and initial …rst-and second-order beliefs i ( jh 0 ) and i (h 0 ), we …rst compute how much i expects to let j down:
where 0 ij (h 0 ) denotes the initial (point) belief of i about the initial …rst-order belief j ( jh 0 ).
Now suppose end node z is reached; the conditional expectation E j ; j ; j [G 0 ij jH j (z)] measures j's inference regarding how much i thinks he lets j down, or how much j "blames" i. We say that i is a¤ected by guilt from blame if he dislikes being blamed. Thus i's preferences are represented by
Player i tries to make the expectation of u
GB i
as large as possible, given his beliefs (up to the fourth order).
When we append the functions (u
) to the given extensive game form we obtain a psychological game with simple guilt (respectively with guilt from blame). 5 We assume that the psychological game has complete information; in particular there is common knowledge of the psychological payo¤ functions (this is clearly farfetched, but incomplete information could be captured by making chance choose the parameters ij ).
III. Equilibrium Analysis
We adapt to the present framework the sequential equilibrium concept of David Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982) . An assessment is a pro…le ( ; ; ; :::) = ( i ; i ; i ; :::) i2N specifying behavior strategies, …rst-and higher-order beliefs. Assessment ( ; ; ; :::) is consistent if there is a strictly positive sequence
; 5 We build on B&D's framework, not that of Geanakoplos et al which would not allow i 's utility to depend on other players'beliefs (in contrast to (1) and (3)) or on updated beliefs (in contrast to (3)). and higher-order beliefs at each information set are correct: 
Adapting an existence proof from B&D, one can show that every psychological game with simple guilt, or guilt from blame, has a SE. 6 We now list some results and examples about the relationships between SE with simple guilt and guilt from blame, as well as SE of the "material-payo¤ game" with payo¤ functions u i m i .
First note that in any two-player game form without chance moves, for every pure-strategy, consistent assessment (s; ; ; :::), every i and s
The …rst equality is an immediate consequence of consistency, the second follows from consistency, perfect recall and observation of own material payo¤. This implies: Observation 1. In any two-person, simultaneous-move game form without chance moves, for any given parameter pro…le ( ij ) i;j2N;j6 =i the pure stategy SE assessments of the psychological games with simple guilt and guilt from blame coincide.
In other games, a SE with simple guilt need not be a SE with guilt from blame, and vice versa. To see this, consider …rst the following three-player simultaneous-move game form: This is the unavoidable expected extent to which Bob will be let down. Thus the expected guilt associated with (in, in) is 2 1 = 1, as compared to 1 1 = 0 for strategy (out, in). Since material payo¤ is not an issue for Ann, she wants to deviate to (out, in).
Yet (in, in) is a SE with guilt from blame. It is supported by Bob's out-of-path beliefs such that if he got a material payo¤ of 2 then he thinks it is because Ann plays strategy (in, out). 7 The expected guilt associated to this strategy is 1=2 4 + 1=2 2 = 3, and this is how much Bob blames Ann if he observes a payo¤ of 2 dollars. If Ann does not deviate, Bob gets a positive probability payo¤ (0 or 8), infers that she is indeed playing (in, in) and therefore his blame on Ann is 1, the expected guilt associated to (in, in). Therefore any deviation from (in, in) increases Bob's blame in expectation. 7 Such a belief is consistent: consider the sequence
Observation 2. In any game form with simultaneous moves, for any parameter pro…le ( ij ) i;j2N;j6 =i , all the pure strategy SE assessments of the material payo¤ game are also SE of the psychological games with simple guilt and guilt from blame.
Proof. Fix a simultaneous game form and a SE (s; ; ; :::). Then, if i deviates from s i he (weakly) decreases his material payo¤. Given , each player j expects to get exactly m j (s); hence, if no deviations occur no player j is let down. By consistency, this implies that given ( ; ) each player i (weakly) increases in expectation the absolute value of each negative component of his psychological payo¤ function if he deviates. Therefore a deviation by any player (weakly) decreases his total payo¤. Q.E.D.
The following parametrized example shows that Observation 2 does not extend to sequential game forms. The example relates also to Observation 1. this is not an SE of the game with guilt from blame: since the equilibrium strategy of Bob is to choose cont., in this case Ann's action in the subgame a¤ects the guilt blamed by Bob on Ann, who would rather Share.
Cont. cont. Share
We close this section by considering an application concerning the provision of public goods.
This exercise highlights the di¤erences between the two types of guilt as well as the huge multiplicity of equilibria that may obtain with such belief-dependent motivations. (1 B), where I k>1 (k) = 0 if k = 1 and I k>1 (k) = 1 otherwise. This is a necessary condition for a SE with k donors, and it is also su¢ cient if each donor gives the same amount. We obtain the same condition as with simple guilt if k = 1 because in this case the deviating donor is identi…ed and "fully blamed". Thus, pro…les with more asymmetric contributions are easier to support because they mitigate the inference problem. Now consider the following variation of the public good game form. Each additional dollar given for the public good yields B additional (dollar) units of public good with probability p < 1 and no social bene…t with probability 1 p, independently of other contributions (assume 1=n < pB < 1). If p 2 B(n 1) (1 B) every pure strategy pro…le is a SE with simple guilt.
But only (0; :::; 0) is a pure SE of the game with guilt from blame. The reason is that every shortfall from the expected amount of public good is blamed on bad luck, thus there is no incentive to give any agreed upon positive contribution (however, for large enough there are mixed SE with positive expected contributions).
IV. Concluding Remarks
We develop a general theory of guilt aversion and show how to solve for sequential equilibria. We hope the approach will prove useful for a variety of applications concerning economic situations where it seems plausible that decision makers are a¤ected by guilt.
To end on a more general note, psychological game theory provides the intellectual home for our approach. do not explicitly refer to psychological games but their work …ts the framework of B&D). The usefulness of psychological game theory for studying these diverse kinds of motivation augurs well for the framework's potential for analyzing also other phenomena including disappointment, regret, anger, surprise, shame, and joy.
